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"Now That I Ate the Sushi, Do We Have
a Deal?" - The Lawyer as Negotiator
in Japanese-U.S. Business Transactions
Robert J. Waiters*

There is timing in everything. * * * [T]here is timing in the Way of the
Merchant, in the rise and fall of capital. All things entail rising and falling
timing. You must be able to discern this. In strategy there are various
timing considerations. From the outset you must know the applicable timing and the inapplicable timing, and from among the large things and small
things and the fast and slow timings find the relevant timing, first seeing the
distance timing and the background timing. This is the main thing in strategy. It is especially important to know
1 the background timing, otherwise
your strategy will become uncertain.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The above-quoted words of Miyamoto Musashi, written in 1645,
epitomized the samarai code of strategy, and in more recent times have
been viewed as an important guide for the Japanese businessperson. 2
They are no less applicable to the U.S. attorney whose client is Japanese
or whose client is engaged in or contemplating a transaction in which one
or more of the opposite parties is Japanese. An attorney's failure to appreciate or become familiar with the importance of the cultural influences which affect the Japanese client or party often reveals itself at a
critical stage of the transaction, and the results can be disastrous.
This article focuses on the role a lawyer may have in a transaction
involving a Japanese client or party. It will encourage the attorney at
* J.D., 1984, University of Wyoming College of Law. The author wishes to express his deepest
appreciation to his wife and best friend, Debra, for her great support and encouragement, without
which this article would not have been possible.
1 M. MUSASHI, A BooK OF FIvE RINGS 48 (V. Harris trans. 1974).
2 Id. at 22. Cf. R. TUNG, BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE 52-53 (1984).
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early stages to look beyond the legal tasks to the underlying reasons for
the transaction. In other words, it encourages the attorney to ask questions and obtain information that ordinarily may not be considered critical to the purely legal aspects of the transaction. The nihonjin3 generally
will place greater emphasis on the development of the relationship.4
Thus, laying the groundwork and devoting sufficient attention to the
"typical" or "expected" stages of a business negotiation will be important
features of the lawyer-negotiator's task.
As background, this article will discuss traits characteristic of the
Japanese as viewed by persons with substantial experience negotiating
with the Japanese. This will include a description of how lawyers and
aspects of the U.S. legal system are viewed by the Japanese, and will be
contrasted with the Japanese legal system. In addition, this article will
provide an overview of the legal framework in Japan for "the practice of
law" by foreign lawyers. An appendix is included which identifies resources which may assist in the development of a negotiation practice.
II. THE NIHONJIN IN CULTURAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
The Japanese are a fairly simple people with a clear set of rules, at
least to the Japanese. United States businesspersons are unaccustomed
to having to conform to a different set of rules than those which apply in
typical U.S. business transactions. The reverse is also true of the Japanese businessperson. Certain rules will apply even when all parties to the
transaction are Japanese. If the rules are not followed, a transaction may
3 The word "nihonjin" refers to the Japanese person. It is in contrast to words such as "Amerikajin" for Americans and 'gaiin" for foreigners generally. The latter literally means "outside person" or "outsider." The Japanese are particularly sensitive not only to their own ethnicity, but to
the status of the person with whom they are interacting. See infra note 11.
4 The relationship will be more important to the Japanese than the written contract itself. See
Mori, A Practitioner'sPerspective on Negotiations and Communication with Japanese Businessmen, in
ABA, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUsINEss IN JAPAN AND EAsT AsIA

47

(J.O. Haley

ed. 1978). The following quote more descriptively expresses the Japanese attitude toward contracts:
Americans carefully observe the law, regulations and contractual agreements, and they make
full use of these legal forms. Japanese do not have a sufficiently clear conception of such legal
forms but honor and trustjij5 [the surrounding circumstances], giri [moral or social obligations
to others], ninj5 [human feeling], yuj5 [friendship], magokoro [sincerity] and so forth ... It is
perhaps well known that Americans observe contractual obligations more closely than the Japanese. Conversely, an American will say that he is not responsible for what he did not agree to.
When a Japanese makes an agreement with another person, the goodwill and friendship that
gave rise to the agreement is more importantto him than the agreementitself. If there is sincerity, it does not matter if the contract itself is not executed exactly according to its terms. To
Americans legal agreements and feelings of friendship are completely different things. In these
circumstances Japanese tend to be occupied with a friendly atmosphere and are careful to see
that the agreement itself is thorough.
Kawashima, The Legal Consciousnessof Contractin Japan,7 LAw IN JAPAN 1, 6-7 (1974) (emphasis
in original).
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not be consummated. Such rules are not eliminated when one of the
parties is from the United States. Rules may be relaxed and transgressions overlooked only when the Japanese party perceives that it is necessary for the success of the transaction, and the U.S. party (or what he or
she brings to the transaction) is indispensable. Thus, one of the first
questions should be "Who is seeking whom?"
If the Japanese party initiates the relationship, the immediate second
question should be "What are they after?" The response to this question
should be divided into two categories: the tatemae and the honne.5 It is
quite likely that the Japanese party already knows a great deal about the
U.S. client or enterprise. Indeed, the attorney is not likely to be brought
in at early stages of meetings between the principal parties. 6 Not having
had the benefit of the ordinary background interactions, the attorney
may not be prepared to answer the "what are they after" question. He or
she must obtain this information from the client (assuming that the client
5 The familiar phrase "form over substance" provides some insight into the concepts of tatemae
and honne. "Tatemae" is the form and "honne" is the substance. Cf. D. ROWLAND, JAPANESE
BUSINESS ETIQUETTE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SUCCESS WITH THE JAPANESE 19-20 (1985); B.
DEMENTE, JAPANESE ETIQUETrE AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS 19-21 (1987); Wagatsuma & Rosett,
infra note 84, at 85-87. Distinction should be made between the two concepts since serious misunderstandings may arise if reliance is placed upon the superficial explanation, and the true intentions
of the Japanese party are not ascertained. "Tatemae" has been described as "official stance" versus
"honne," which is translated as "true mind" or "real intentions." J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, SMART
BARGAINING 23-24 (1984); see also R. MARCH, THE JAPANESE NEGOTIATOR: SUBTLETY AND

STRATEGY BEYOND WESTERN LOGIC 141-42. Such behavior has been explained as the result of
Japanese socialization which places "face" over one's true feelings, where the social situation dictates
behavior and speech. Id. Most Japanese accept and recognize the tatemae-honne duality as valid
and appropriate and a mark of human maturity, where the failure to recognize this norm smacks of
insensitivity and bad taste. E. FROST, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER: THE NEW U.S.-JAPANEE RELATIONSHIP 91-92 (1987). Although the Japanese use oftatemae may be perceived as dishonest and
manipulative to most Americans, especially to those who have had little experience in interactions
with the Japanese, it should not be viewed as such. Indeed, the use of tatemae by the Japanese
counterpart should be expected because a situational use of tatemae for outsiders (the gajin) and
honne for insiders is common practice in Japan. M. MATSUMOTO, THE UNSPOKEN WAY HARAGEI: SILENCE IN JAPANESE BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 65 (1988). Accordingly, suspicion should
be avoided, especially in early stages. Any ambiguity in the relationship between the parties will not
be resolved until the Japanese side has settled on a position respecting not only the viability of the
transaction but the potential for compatibility between the parties.
6 Unlike U.S. transactions which are consummated fairly quickly, requiring attorneys to be
involved in the negotiations from the outset, Japanese negotiations seek to determine compatibility
and strategic fit, such as access to desired markets or technology. Information which the Japanese
investor or company is not able to obtain through ordinary resources is sought in the early stages
through informal meetings. Another reason lawyers are not typically a part of early negotiations is
because they are viewed with suspicion and distrust. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying discussion. See The Trouble with Lawyers, 4 BUSINESS TOKYO 26, 29 (Oct. 1990) [hereinafter Lawyers]
(suggesting that the lawyer should be brought in after the "getting to know you" phase of
negotiations).
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is not the Japanese party7), who may only view the entire transaction in
its superficial elements. The importance of the client understanding the
Japanese party's motivation in the transaction should not be overlooked.
If it is the U.S. client which seeks to initiate the transaction, the immediate second question should be "What have you done thus far?" Unless
the U.S. client has laid or is willing to lay the "correct" groundwork, a
great deal of effort and expense will likely be wasted.' In this context,
however, focus should be directed at the desirability of the transaction
from the Japanese viewpoint. In the former context discussed above, the
Japanese party had already determined that the transaction was necessary or desirable for its objectives, and the selected opposite party or parties showed at least adequate promise.9 With the burden on the U.S.
client to convince a Japanese company or investor of the desirability of
the transaction, the task is more difficult and the client should be prepared for a more lengthy and laborious process.
A.

The Structure of Japanese Negotiations

Business negotiations with the Japanese occur in discernible
stages. 10 In either the Japanese-initiated transaction or the U.S.-initiated
transaction, the formal beginning point is the aisatsu." At the aisatsu,
7 A Japanese client is likely to consult a U.S. attorney only for legal advice or to prepare documents which only the U.S. attorney could do, or for representation in litigation in a U.S. forum. See
Zaloom, Problems Facing Japanese Firms Entering the United States and their Counsel, in ABA,
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 42 (J.O. Haley ed.
1978).
8 Negotiating with Japanese companies requires extensive preparation, not only by analyzing
the market, the business environment and the competition, but in the selection of the form of entry
or business partner. M. MATSUSHITA & T. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LAW 47-48 (1989).
9 The term "adequate promise" should actually be viewed as a question of strategic fit or compatibility. The Japanese company in international negotiations is seeking a relationship characterized by friendship, trust, and respect between the negotiating parties. Zhang & Kuroda, Beware of
Japanese NegotiatingStyle: How to Negotiate with Japanese Companies, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
195, 201 (1989). This is, of course, secondary to maintaining the security between the company and
its employees which is characteristic of Japanese companies (kaisha) and influenced significantly by
the Japanese concepts of wa and amae. For further discussion of amae and wa see infra notes 14 and
21, respectively.
10 These stages have been suggested as 1) non-task sounding, 2) task-related exchange of information, 3) persuasion, and 4) concessions and agreement. J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at
69-92.

Cf. D. MCCREARY, JAPANESE - U.S. BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS CULTURAL

STUDY 25-26 (1986); Graham, Negotiating with the Japanese: A Guide to Persuasive Tactics, 10 E.
ASIAN ExEc. REP. 8 (Dec. 1988).
11 The aisatsu is the formal introduction of the principal parties. JETRO, DOING BUSINESS IN
JAPAN 47 (1984). In significant or major transactions, it may be characterized by a meeting of the
higher ranking officials or executives of each company. The aisatsu is viewed not as the time to
discuss details of the transactions, but as a means for the parties to become acquainted and to be-
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the most important ritual is the exchanging of business cards, or as the
Japanese call them, the meishi. 2 The Japanese place a great deal of emphasis on status and corresponding etiquette. This ritual assists them in
clarifying these issues, so each individual may receive the appropriate
level of respect.13 This also provides an opportunity for each side to become acquainted with members of the negotiation teams and other important company personnel. Moreover, it is at this stage that the
Japanese side will try to determine the level of trust that may be expected
between the parties.14
Before the actual negotiations have begun, it is important to be
aware of the so-called "Japanese Negotiation Strategies" 15 and make appropriate preparations. The objectives of the Japanese participants, as
come familiar with the overall plan. Id. See also B. DEMENTE, supra note 5, at 142; J. GRAHAM &
Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 4-5. Details of the transaction are left initially to persons involved inthe
underlying subject matter.
The aisatsu should not occur until some groundwork has been laid, particularly with the U.S.initiated transaction. This includes the use of a contact common to the parties as a conduit for the
introductions, or the utilization of firms which specialize in such matters or referral by a recognized
organization such as the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE (INrr'L TRADE ADMIN.), MARKETING IN JAPAN 19 (Overseas Business Report, Apr. 1987)
[hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE]. If possible, profiles of the companies involved and key
personnel should be obtained and discussed as part of the briefing prior to the actual aisatsu.
If the attorney is involved at this stage of the relationship, attempts to relieve the anxiety that
his or her presence is likely to cause should be made by indicating his or her role as a facilitator of
the negotiations. R. TUNG, supranote 2, at 44. See also infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
12 Meishi should be two-sided, with the same information printed on both sides: in English on
one side and in Japanese characters (kana and kanji) on the reverse. When handed to Japanese
counterparts, the Japanese side should be face up and readable without fumbling. One should pause
and read the meishi asking questions to confirm understanding of the information or to determine
common ground between particular individuals, instead of merely taking the card and placing it in a
pocket. Several authors have suggested appropriate etiquette in the exchange ofmeishi which should
be consulted. See E. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 31-33 (1984); R.
TUNG, supranote 2, at 59-60; D. ROWLAND, supranote 5, at 14-17; JETRO, supra note 11, at 27-39.
13 D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 31. Status distinctions are ingrained in Japanese culture and
dictate what can or cannot be said and what bargaining strategies may be used during Japanese
business negotiations. J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 19-20. See also R. TUNG, supranote
2, at 59-61.
14 This is tied to the concept of amae, which is a significantly important underlying dynamic in
Japanese society embracing business as well as family contexts. Amae is "dependence" in a pure
form not unlike that which exists between mother and child. It has been described as "a feeling of
complete trust and confidence, not only that the other party will not take advantage of them, but also
that they - business or private individuals - can presume upon the indulgence of the other." B.
DEMENTE, supra note 5, at 12 (emphasis in the original). Cf D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 3132; R. MARCH, supra note 5, at 134.
15 These have been characterized as "Normative Strategies" (which are culture-based and include politeness, mutual cooperation and compromise, obligation and pre-giving), "Rational Strategies" (which are characterized by team organization, trust building, the use of amae, information
seeking orientation and the like), "Assertive Strategies" (such as bulldozing or persistence, tactical
questioning, repetitive discussions on subject matter believed to be settled), "Avoidance Strategies"
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well as the role of each individual, and their company's overall goal will
likely have been established. This may or may not imply a predetermined or particular time period for consummating an agreement. The
typical Japanese approach is methodical and deliberate. The Japanese
16
side generally is prepared for a lengthy and time-consuming process.
Selection of the appropriate team is an important preliminary, based
in part on information obtained prior to and at the aisatsu.17 The personnel selected may be critical to the process. Potential issues of dispute or
difficulty must be identified and strategies developed to resolve them.18
Awareness of the personnel which the Japanese side has selected will be
important, although it should not be assumed that these persons have the
authority to bind the Japanese side to any particular point. 9 On the
(such as the use of silence, vague and noncommittal responses) and "Nonverbal Expression." R.
MARCH, supra note 5, at 127-52.
16 One commentator noted that some long-term contracts have been known to take as long as
two years to negotiate. Mori, supra note 4, at 48. Cf R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 176 (six years).
Again, it should be emphasized that the Japanese company in any transaction has a greater concern
for the development of a long term relationship. Actual length of the negotiations will depend upon
substantive issues which the parties will need to resolve, and the Japanese level of comfort or confidence in the relationship. Awareness of cultural dynamics as well as typical practices will assist in
eliminating wasted time over unnecessary misunderstandings. Though Japanese decision-making is
time-consuming, there are advantages to this system. Once a decision has been reached it will be
supported by the entire organization and its implementation can be expected to occur in a smooth
manner. In addition, the chances of serious error are significantly reduced because the "hands-on"
personnel as well as other levels of management have provided input and will understand the requirements. Lansing & Wechselblatt, Doing Business in Japan: The Importance of Unwritten Law,
17 INT'L LAW. 647, 656 (1983).
17 See J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 33-50, where an entire chapter is devoted to the
subject. The Japanese negotiating team will consist of several players, each having a distinct role.
Negotiations conducted by a single person representing the U.S. firm present the potential for disadvantage. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the principal U.S. negotiator have several assistants. D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 29-30.
18 J. GRAHAM & Y. SANG, supra note 5, at 51-57. The authors suggest that a checklist should
include: 1) assessment of the situation and the people, 2) facts to confirm the negotiation, 3) agendas,
and 4) the best alternative to a negotiation agreement or a contingency plan.
19 Watts, Briefing the American Negotiatorin Japan, 16 INT'L LAW. 597, 605 (1982). This has
been described as characteristic of Japanese negotiating style (Le. step by step negotiations), in which
particular lower-ranking company staff are involved in the initial stages of the negotiation, followed
by involvement by middle-ranking managers in charge of relevant sections of the negotiation, followed by participation of one or more senior executives of the company who finalizes decisions or
signs the agreement. This allows for later alteration, which means that what appears as early concessions by lower-ranking personnel may not be considered binding in later stages. This is also central
to the ringi system of consensus decision-making of the Japanese, which itself is characterized by a
series of discussions between middle- and lower-management through a process of ringisho and
nemawashiwhich precedes final go ahead by higher company officials. For further discussion of this
dynamic, see Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 197-201; Hahn, NegotiatingContractswith the Japanese, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 377, 381 n. 16; J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 24-25.
See also JETRO, supra note 11, at 39-45. This should have substantial impact on timing considerations, as well as influence travel and accommodations planning in Japan.
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other hand, information critical to the transaction or which discloses
how the transaction fits into the overall objectives of the Japanese party
should be discerned to the extent possible prior to the first business meeting. The U.S. party should not overlook preparations necessary to respond to the Japanese side's need for information, however. Thus, a
significant amount of preparation will precede the actual discussions incident to the negotiation.
Once the negotiations have begun, awareness of Japanese communication styles and how they are used in business negotiations is crucial.
Such styles are also influenced by cultural norms. 20 The most important
is the concept of wa, which seeks above all to maintain harmony. 2 ' If the
Japanese side makes a concession, it will expect reciprocity from the opposite party. Unwillingness by the U.S. side to accommodate is threatening to the wa because the sense of amae which was established in the
aisatsu may become compromised. This in turn may cause the Japanese
side to retreat and either rethink its position or suspend or terminate
further negotiations.2 2 As one author has aptly put it, "[f]or the Japanese, a contract is the end result of having established a relationship of
trust and friendship." 2
Another way in which wa is expressed is in the communications between the respective negotiating teams.2 4 One key area is the Japanese
20 See, eg., Van de Velde, The Influence of Culture on Japanese-American Negotiations, 7
FLETCHER F. 395 (1983); R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946); G.
FIELDS, FROM BONSAI TO LEVIS (1983); E. HALL & M. HALL, infra note 24, at 39-61. But see
Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 209, where the authors note that negotiation tactics may vary
depending on whether a Japanese firm or a U.S. firm initiates the transaction. In the former situation, the Japanese negotiators will more or less adopt the approach of the U.S. negotiators. Traditional Japanese forms will prevail in the latter, particularly in small or medium-sized firms.
21 Wa is a symbiotic concept which deemphasizes "self" in all contexts, family, social, and business. One author notes that wa is exhibited in several forms: 1) in group or consensus decisionmaking, 2) by avoidance of extremes and tendency to take the middle ground, 3) avoidance of confrontation by disguising one's true feelings or the situational use of tatemae and honne, 4) in the
Japanese emphasis on saving face, and 5) in compromising and conciliation (a means of facilitating
dispute resolution). R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 49. Accord, J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at
23-24; B. DEMENTE, supra note 5, at 36-46; D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 27-32. The situational
use of tatemae and honne, in particular, is said to indicate "the willingness of the Japanese to set
aside general rules or principals (including law), whenever the immediate needs and wants of the
people in the immediate situation require it." Parker, Law, Language, and the Individual in Japan
and the United States, 7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 179, 200 (1988).
22 Again, the Japanese stress the importance of establishing goodwill and a good working relationship upon which parties may rely as situations dictate, including the harmonious resolution of
future problems. R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 55-58; Zhang & Kuroda, supra, note 9, at 201. The
sense of dependence and dependability are important ingredients to this working trust. If these are
absent, the relationship is questioned. See also Watts, supra note 19, at 602-03.
23 Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 16, at 654.
24 One author has described the U.S.-style of negotiations as "the John Wayne Style," which is

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12:335(1991)

propensity to avoid confrontation or extremes, to be indirect or vague, to
be concerned with "saving face." 2 5 Thus, it is said that the U.S. negotiator should not assume that assent or concession to any particular point
has occurred simply because no disagreement has been articulated, or by
mere verbal communications which the U.S. negotiator may literally interpret to mean "yes." 26 On the other hand, the Japanese also engage in
communicative behavior which may present some confusion or discomfort for the U.S. negotiator. This breaks down into two areas. The first
is the use of nonverbal behavior, such as silence. The second is the use of
language, both foreign and Japanese. Lack of awareness of the meaning
of such behavior often results in the U.S. side making concessions which
were unnecessary to form an agreement.27
Nonverbal communication is a strategy used by the Japanese and is
referred to as haragei.2 s It is more likely to occur during crucial stages of
the negotiations and may be characterized as either "hot" or "cool." 2 9
The former may be accompanied by a naniwabushiapproach, or a veiled
threat or bluff to obtain a concession or get past a stalemate involving a
counter to the Japanese style. J. GRAHAM & Y. SANo, supra note 5, at 7-16. The potential for
conflict is rooted in cultural differences in basic values, which also influences business negotiation
styles. Id. at 31-33 (see especially Table 3-2). See also E. HALL & M. HALL, HIDDEN DIFFERENcES: DOING BUSINESS WrrH THE JAPANESE 114-29 (1987). Cf Moran, Business Negotiations and
the Japanese View ofAmericans, 8 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP.17 (Mar. 15, 1986).
25 R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 53-55. This is most clearly exhibited in the Japanese reluctance to
say "no." Instead, the Japanese will use such phrases as "Let's think about it a little more," or
"We'll do our best," or even not respond at all. See D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 61-66. Cf J.
GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 23-24. When this happens, it is suggested that the U.S.
negotiator ask the Japanese for more information or pose indirect questions which will get them
talking about their concerns. D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 66. Becoming argumentative or
persisting on the point tends to be counter-productive.
26 Often, the U.S. negotiator will rely on nonverbal cues, such as the affirmative nod of the head,
or simple expressions of affirmation, to determine whether he or she is persuading the opposite party.
In negotiations, such nonverbal cues and the use of the word "hai"(which literally means "yes"), do
not signify assent. See, e.g., D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 60-61; JETRO, supra note 11, at 3941; E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 44; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, at 19-20. This is the
flip side of the Japanese reluctance to say "no." The intent of the latter is to avoid discord by
disagreement or a flat rejection. In the former, the intent is to superficially indicate that the point is
heard or understood. If the subject matter deviates from "Japanese agenda," consensus decisionmaking dictates that the point be considered in typical ringisho and nemawashifashion before agreement is communicated.
27 This phenomenon has been noted by several authors, particularly when Japanese negotiators
engage in silence. See, e.g., J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 14; D. MCCREARY, supra note
10, at 53-54.
28 Harageihas been explained as "a technique for solving a problem through negotiation between two individuals without the use of direct words." D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 45. See
generally M. MATSUMOTO, supra note 5.
29 Hot harageirefers to those critical situations in which breakdown is imminent, whereas cool
haragei refers to less critical situations where metamessage (communications of a subtle but unmistakable nature) or silence of harageireplaces direct talk. D. McCREARY, supra note 10, at 47-58.
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significant issue.3 0 The latter, on the other hand, typically utilizes silence
or less dramatic approaches. It is important to recall that the use of
harageiis strategic, seeking appropriate or desired responses. 31 Accordingly, the tatemae which the Japanese side communicates must be distinguished from the honne which is sought to be achieved.3 2
When the Japanese side becomes silent during discussions, it should
not be interpreted to mean that the U.S. proposal has been rejected. The
silence, particularly if the proposal is new or a modified version of a prior
proposal, may simply mean that the Japanese side has not considered the
new or modified term in typical consensus fashion and has not resolved it
internally for response. 33 Silence may also reflect that an impasse has
been reached and that it is time for each side to reconsider their positions.34 Of course, silence may not be intended to communicate a
message at all because it is otherwise considered virtuous or appropriate
by the Japanese at certain times.3 5
When the Japanese negotiator "speaks," the popular imagery of the
entourage of two-sworded samurai duty-bound to their master may come
to mind, where one sword represents the Japanese language and the
other represents the use of English or other foreign language. This image
is reinforced when one considers that the Japanese negotiation team typically consists of nonlegal staff. The use of nonlegal staff in negotiations is
common and intentional; it serves to insulate the Japanese counsel and to
control some aspects of the negotiation. 6 Some will be involved directly
30 Id. at 53-56. Naniwabushi is an approach which seeks empathy and concession through an
emotional appeal to the opposite party. See, e-g., J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 21-22.
31 This dimension of Japanese negotiation is referred to as "awase," which is intended to create
an atmosphere conducive to frank discussions and to lead to relationships that permit the parties to
make accommodations and exceptions as circumstances dictate. Van de Velde, supra note 20, at
397. The ability to be frank about motives and long term objectives may have the additional benefit
of avoiding unnecessary delay in the negotiations. Mori, supra note 4, at 48.
32 See supra note 5 for discussion of tatemae and honne.
33 See supra note 19. See also J. GRAHAM & Y. SANo, supra note 5, at 14 (suggesting that the
U.S. discomfort with silence, often marked by efforts to compensate with persuasive appeals, is
counterproductive because it does not permit effective or necessary exchanges of information, especially from the Japanese); R. MARCH, supra note 5, at 140-41 (suggesting that silence may be used
because the issue or request is misunderstood, or to buy time to contemplate the appropriate
response).
34 R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 55. See also D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 54, indicating that
responses to silence such as criticism, anger or impatience may surprise and confuse the Japanese.
35 E. HALL & M. HALL, supra note 24, at 126; D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 51-52; E. FROST,
supra note 5, at 86-87.
36 One commentator has suggested that these persons will have a "limited" ability to use English
which may be used as a means to retain boilerplate language with complicated legal terminology or
to force U.S. negotiators to explain the legal concepts in a plain or more easily understood form.
Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 203-04. Since these persons will have little or no authority to bind
the Japanese company, this also permits the channeling of information to the appropriate staff to
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in the discussions and others will be responsible for observing and note37

taking.

A common tactic is that a Japanese negotiator may pretend not to
understand English, not to understand it very well, or may misunderstand intentionally.38 On the other hand, it should not be assumed that
"common" words have the same meaning or connotation to the Japanese. For example, the fact that both sides are jointly entering into a
transaction, which in part will be governed by a "contract," does not
mean that the written agreement connotes the same thing to the Japanese
side that it does to the U.S. side. The Japanese word for "contract" is
keiyaku, which does not imply a legally enforceable promise or set of
promises, but rather the promissory stage of negotiations in which the
parties agree to work together to create a mutually advantageous
39
relationship.
In anticipation of these and other types of language-related barriers,
the U.S. side may attempt to compensate by using interpreters or a Japanese-speaking negotiator. Although this practice is sometimes recommended (despite the likelihood that the principal Japanese negotiators
are sufficiently proficient in English or the appropriate foreign language'), the interpreter must be more than a translator and should be
briefed on the subject matter, the objectives and other background information. 4 The use of "legalese" by the lawyer may create some specific
difficulties for an interpreter and should be avoided because of the unavailability of precise translation.42
Sometimes, however, the ability to communicate in Japanese can
have adverse effects. It may cause the Japanese side to believe that the
speaker has greater ability to comprehend what is said, or to require a
obtain direction. Consequently, the Japanese negotiators will have control over the pace of the negotiations and the dissemination of information. Mori, supranote 4, at 49. Methods to obtain repeated
explanations will also help the Japanese side to understand the motives of the United States side. Id.
37 D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 29.
38 See Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 204-05. The authors warn that this type of "sword and
shield" approach of purported "limited" English ability may lull the U.S. negotiators to confer
openly in front of the Japanese negotiators, unintentionally revealing information from the U.S. side
on the false assumption that it would not be "understood." In addition, the U.S. negotiators may
become exasperated into making concessions or dropping certain points.
39 Id. at 206. But see Note, "Working It Out" A JapaneseAlternative to Fighting It Out, 37
CLaV. ST. L. REV. 149, 161-62 (1989) [hereinafter Working It Out].
40 See R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 96. The practice to de-emphasize the speaker's fluency in a
foreign language is not necessarily intended to be dishonest or misleading and may be simply a form
of etiquette.
41 See, e.g., D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 56-58.
42 E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 42.
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different posture in manner of speech.4 3 There is the potential that unintended meanings may offend the Japanese and actually backfire.' When
the U.S. attorney chooses to speak nihongo (Japanese) during the negotiations, the importance of using the correct level of politeness must be
kept in mind.4 5

Equally important to what is being said to and by the Japanese
negotiators is the identity of the speakers and how those persons fit

within the Japanese hierarchy. A specific job title may not mean that
such a person wields the same authority as a U.S. negotiator with a comparable or identical title.4 6 It is not unlikely that the Japanese company's
legal counsel or higher-ranking executives may seek to reverse or renegotiate unfavorable terms on the ground that they are the only ones who
have the authority to bind the company despite "agreement" by the
lower ranking staff.4 7

This is consistent with the Japanese view of contracts, which is in
stark contrast to the typical U.S. view. Moreover, it reflects the normative influences to maintain wa, which must be reflected in the manner in
which each party is willing to accommodate the other if the circumstances dictate, including the manner of resolving disputes. In this sense,
the contract is only the tatemae, but the relationship between the parties
is the honne. Unwillingness to resolve disputes in a harmonious manner,
which first seeks to preserve the relationship and second the particular
transaction, will cause the Japanese side to be reluctant to finalize the
contract.4 8 Insistence by the U.S. party to rely on the written agreement
43 Japanese etiquette dictates the use of certain levels of speech. depending on the status of the
person the speaker is addressing. See B. DEMErNTE, supra note 5, at 99. The more proficient a
speaker, the less tolerant the Japanese side may be regarding breaches of etiquette. At times, the
perception that a Japanese-speaking U.S. negotiator may understand more than would ordinarily be
expected, may cause the Japanese side to engage in "codeswitching" between formal and colloquial
forms of speech among themselves to conceal meanings or to continue the ability to confer in the
presence of U.S. negotiators. See D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 40-43.
44 Id. at 43; R. TUNG, supra note 2, at 58-59.
45 See Hahn, supra note 19, at 384.
46 Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 207 n. 40. See JETRO, supra note 11, at 27-39, which
provides some discussion of particular job titles in Japanese companies and their position in the
hierarchy. Along those lines, attention should be made to whom most of the communications
should be directed. It has been suggested that as between the one at the head of the table and the one
or ones taking notes or asking the most questions, the latter are likely personnel to whom persuasive
comments should be made. See, eg., G. FIELDS, supra note 20, at 176-77.
47 Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 198. As the authors point out, however, it is fairly common
practice that in Japanese transactions, even when all the parties are Japanese, early agreements may
be altered or reversed at early stages. Id.
48 The Japanese side will insist on a provision in the contract which requires the parties to confer
in good faith regarding future disputes and to settle the dispute harmoniously by consultation. See
infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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to resolve disputes indicates to the nihonjin that the necessary amae ingredient in the relationship is missing. Without amae, there can be no
wa.

Japanese negotiations exist within an environment and at a pace
which presents the likelihood that the U.S. party will accommodate the
needs of the Japanese party beyond the specific contractual terms. This
is true not only in the actual business discussions, but also in social contexts, such as "after-hours" socializing.49 It is common for the Japanese
side to seek to reinforce the sense of amae by returning over and over to
issues which the U.S. side believed had been resolved.50 It is likely that
the draft agreement also will be subject to countless revisions, even if the
provisions at issue are considered "boilerplate" by U.S. standards.5 1
Once the principal contract terms are settled and the Japanese side
has confidence in the reliability and durability of the "contractual" relationship,5 2 execution of the contract will be imminent. No assumption
should be made, however, respecting the time frame in which the agreement should be consummated, unless such parameters were introduced
at the aisatsu and the Japanese side made a commitment to execution of
an agreement within the desired period.5 3
Nor should it be assumed that the actual contract will be a detailed
document, since the Japanese side will attempt to negotiate a written
agreement in broad, familiar terms. Sensitivity to this aspect, however,
will be heavily influenced by the level of experience of the Japanese party
at the international level, the relative sophistication of the Japanese side
in legal matters,54 and the forum in which the agreement is to be en49 See, eg., D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 65-68; B. DEMENTE, supra note 5, at 94-97; E.
HAHN, supra note 12, at 36-37. The after-hours socializing in part is a means for the Japanese "to be
themselves." It is also used as a means to get to know co-workers and new members to a joint
enterprise. Cf. Wagatsuma & Rosett, infra note 84, at 88, where the authors state:
Japanese like to be among kigokoro no shiretanakama (those whose dispositions are well known
to each other). Among the kigokoro no shireta friends and colleagues, Japanese can be relaxed,
informal, frank and trusting.
50 This is a negotiation tactic referred to as regurgitation. D. MCCREARY, supra note 10, at 3840. Use of this tactic by the U.S. side is cautioned, however, because the motives will be questioned.
Id.
51 Mori, supra note 4, at 50.
52 This aspect is considered critical to long-term success and durability of the contractual relationship. Several authors suggest that it is crucial that the U.S. side seek to maintain the relationship
by calling upon the Japanese side at intervals after the execution of the formal agreement. See, eg.,
J. GRAHAM & Y. SANO, supra note 5, at 99-100.

53 The downside to a particular deadline or stated time frame is that the Japanese side's awareness of the need for urgency may create a tactical advantage for them. Holding out to the last
minute may result in concessions by the U.S. side to avoid missing the deadline. E. HAHN, supra
note 12, at 37-38.
54 Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 206-207.
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forced.5 5 One nonetheless should not overlook the influence of traditional norms and emphasis on wa, trust, and internal resolution of
problems by the parties themselves, and how these will affect the
negotiations. 6
B. The "Regulatory" Influence of the Japanese Government
There are two significant features to the role of the Japanese government in international transactions. The first is the extent to which the
transaction must be approved by a particular agency, and the second is
what is referred to as "administrative guidance." The former is embodied by enactments such as the Japanese Antimonopoly Act 57 and the Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FETCL). s
For example, under the Antimonopoly Act, all international agreements
must be submitted to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission for approval
within thirty days after they are executed.5 9 The FETCL imposes notice
requirements on foreign investors of direct domestic investment transactions and reporting requirements on parties to international joint ventures which must be filed with the Japanese Ministry of Finance.' The
FETCL also authorizes the Japanese government to order alterations to
or suspend such direct domestic investment transactions.6 1 If the client
desires to do business in Japan on a continual basis, the Commercial
Code requires the appointment of a representative in Japan, registration
with the government and notice of registration.6 2
However, it may be more critical for the lawyer to be cognizant of
the importance of administrative guidance. The most noteworthy aspect
of administrative guidance, or gyosei shido, is that an applicable govern55 Cf E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 79-80.
56 Id. at 10-11.
57 Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade in
Japan, Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended, reprinted in JAPAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC LAWS OF JAPAN 595 (1979) [hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Act].
58 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, Law No. 228 of 1949, as amended [hereinafter FETCL].
59 Anti-Monopoly Act, supra note 57, at art. 6(2). See also Higgins, JapaneseFair Trade Commission Review ofInternationalAgreements,3 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 43, 44-45 (1980);
Hiroshi, Antitrust and IndustrialPolicy in Japan: Competition and Cooperation, in LAW & TRADE
ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 56-82 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1986); K.
ISHIZUNI, ACQUIRING JAPANESE COMPANIES 194-204 (1988).

60 FETCL, supra note 58, at arts. 27 and 29, respectively. See also K. ISHIZUMI, supra note 59,
at 185-93.
61 See Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 211; McArthur, Joint Ventures in Japan, 20 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REv. 471, 487-88 (1986) (noting that the Japanese government is authorized to impose
restrictions on the importation of technology into Japan).
62 E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 81.
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ment agency is recognized as being able to exert influence to require that
a particular business, Japanese or foreign, engage in particular acts or
refrain from a particular course despite the absence of specific statutory
authority.6 3 The best definition of administrative guidance may be "a
request made by an administrative body for voluntary cooperation.""
Although there are instances in which administrative guidance reflects
specific statutory authority,6 5 the reference typically is to the "informal"
means of obtaining compliance. Such action is preferred among the Japanese over more formal administrative decisions, such as orders or directives, because it is conducive to the normative influence of wa, which in
this context is intended to preserve important values of harmony and
consensus between the government and business.66
Three separate categories of administrative guidance are generally
recognized: (1) promotional or "protective" administrative guidance, (2)
conciliatory administrative guidance, and (3) regulatory administrative
guidance.6 7 It should be recognized that these forms of government
"regulation" are not only used as a "shield" by the Japanese government,
but also may be used as a "sword." The best example of administrative
guidance as a sword is the oft-cited Sumitomo case, in which the
Sumitomo Metal Mining Company refused to comply with suggestions
issued by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) to limit production of certain industrial goods. Ultimately,
63 An analytical discussion of administrative guidance is beyond the scope of this article. However, the subject is one which should not be overlooked. Other noteworthy works which should be
consulted are Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAW IN JAPAN 45 (1968); Young, Administrative
Guidance in the Courts:A Case Study in DoctrinalAdaption, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 120 (1984); Haley,
Administrative Guidance versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Paradox of IndustrialPolicy, in
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES
107-28 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura eds. 1985); F. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
POSTWAR JAPAN 166-204 (1987); C. JOHNSON, MITA AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982).
64 M. MATSUSHITA & T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8,at 31.

65 Id. at 34 (noting that some laws authorize the agency to issue "suggestions" (kankoku) or
"warnings" (keikoku), such as the Petroleum Industry Law which authorizes MITI to recommend
price and production levels so that supply will not exceed projected demand); and E. HAHN, supra
note 12, at 122-23 (noting MITI's authority to regulate business in international trade under the
Export Trade Control Order and the Export and Import Transactions Law, the latter of which
requires exporters to obtain written approval from MITI and grants MITI broad power to forbid or
attach conditions on licenses).
66 M. MATSUSHITA & T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 8, at 31-32. The authors suggest that the
Japanese generally feel that government directives must be respected, whether they are based on
legal authority or not. Id. at 33.
67 See, e.g., id. at 32. Promotional administrative guidance is advice and information given to
enterprises to advance and promote their own interests. Conciliatory administrative guidance is
used to assist private enterprises to solve disputes among themselves. Regulatory administrative
guidance is used by government agencies to regulate the conduct of business enterprises and persons,
often as a substitute to formal action.
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MITI threatened to curtail Sumitomo's foreign coal import quota, an
action fully embraced by statutory authority, and the matter was settled
by the two entities.68
The clearest example of the use of administrative guidance as a
shield, on the other hand, is barriers to entry in particular markets or
professions. The lesson is clear: cooperation with relevant government
agencies and officials is critical to survival and success. This suggests an
aspect of administrative guidance which presents the greatest difficulty
for foreign businesses and reflects a potential disadvantage that foreign
businesses face compared with their Japanese counterparts in the area of
access to administrative officials.69 Accordingly, both U.S. management
and attorneys must develop personal contacts with the bureaucrats, just
as the Japanese do.7 0

Two further implications should be noted. First, the attorney
should become familiar with the particular Japanese agencies which will
have regulatory jurisdiction over the transaction. This awareness should
assist in determination of the overall time period within which the transaction should be consummated. Of course, one should not overlook the
possibility that the Japanese party to the transaction may attempt to gain
some concessions from the U.S. party during the negotiations because the
regulatory agency might "impose" certain conditions to the transaction.
Familiarity with the scope of the agency's authority may preclude misunderstandings over matters which are formally required.
Second, if the lawyer is expected to make contact with a Japanese
government official, such individual or individuals should be approached
cautiously and in a similar manner to the early stages of a negotiation,
Japanese-style. In other words, the lawyer should seek to obtain a letter
of introduction and, in a nonaggressive manner, explain the scope of the
transaction and its objectives. Early meetings should be devoted to no
more than obtaining information and allowing the agency official to be68 E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 118-20. Cf Stevens, JapaneseLaw and the JapaneseLegal System: Perspectivesfor the American Business Lawyer, 27 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1266-67 (1972) (discussing
use of administrative guidance to keep foreign businesses within approved purposes); Zhang &
Kuroda, supra note 9, at 211-12 (government may use its powers often in an unrelated field to
discipline an uncooperative business).
69 Stevens, supra note 68, at 1267. Access here does not refer to the ability of a particular
business to obtain a conference with officials in government agencies, but is a recognition that linguistic and cultural inexperience or difficulties often preclude efflective direct communication and the
reality that foreign businesses rarely possess liaisons with particular agencies which come from the
hiring of retired Japanese officials. As a result, these businesses must rely on U.S. and Japanese
lawyers in Japan, which may be counterproductive because lawyers are viewed with suspicion as
antagonistic. Id.
70 J. HUDDLESTON, GAUIN KAISHA: RUNNING A FOREIGN BUSINESS IN JAPAN 86 (1990).
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come familiar with the important representatives, including the attorney.
Some authors have suggested that these contacts with Japanese officials
occur principally through the Japanese partner.7 If the U.S. side
chooses to appear independent of the Japanese side, less confusion regarding the motive may occur if the intention is communicated from the
Japanese side.
To summarize, the most difficult aspect likely to trouble the U.S.
lawyer is the important role administrative guidance will play in the
transaction. To the extent he or she has been successful in influencing
U.S. government agencies, such as by use of the threat of litigation to
challenge or compel agency action, it should be understood that the rules
are different in Japan and resort to similar approaches will be counterproductive for the client.7" Nor should the U.S. attorney view the Japanese agency as a forum to resolve disputes between the U.S. and Japanese
parties because such intervention is said to be nonexistent between the
Japanese government and foreign parties.73
C.

The Role of Japanese Counsel

Japanese attorneys will be noticeably absent during most aspects of
the negotiation of the transaction, but this absence is only superficial.
The attorneys representing the Japanese side will have been kept informed not only as to the progress of the negotiations, but will have utilized nonlegal staff to seek clarification of particular terms and their
meanings in early drafts of the written agreement. 74 The Japanese attitude toward lawyers, both Japanese and U.S., will be discussed later in
this article.
However, it should be noted that the Japanese side will consider
direct involvement by an attorney in negotiations to be counterproductive to the necessary bartering of terms and conditions, unless it is clear
that the U.S. attorney will play a non-adversarial role in the negotiations.
Even then, distrust and suspicion are likely to delay the formation of an
agreement.
71 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 19, at 607; R. TUNG, supranote 2, at 88. See also Libby, Retaining
Legal Counsel in Japan: Guidelinesfor New-to-Market Firms, 12 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 17, 18 (July
1990) (suggesting that a qualified Japanese attorney should also be involved); Miyake, The Who,
Whens, and Hows of Retaining Legal Counsel in Japan, Presentation at the ABA National Institute
entitled "Japan-United States Trade and Investment: Strategies for the 1990's," 10-11 (Nov. 30 Dec. 1, 1989) (indicating that in negotiations with national or local government agencies which
involve sensitive areas, the appropriate Japanese attorney can be critical).
72 Cf. Lawyers, supra note 6, at 29.
73 Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 212.
74 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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The Japanese attorney is considered the specialist and is only called
in to consult on a particular problem.7" The attorney's principal role is
to review the contractual provisions of the agreement for language
problems and consistency with the intent of the parties, particularly that
of the Japanese side.76 On the other hand, involving the Japanese attorney to resolve disputes during the negotiations may have the effect of
saving time instead of regurgitating previously discussed issues and potentially raising additional areas of misunderstanding. In addition, the
Japanese attorney advises on particular questions of Japanese law to the
extent that they arise in the course of negotiations.
III.

JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND LAWYERS

A.

Historical and Cultural Influences

The relatively quiet role the Japanese lawyer plays in international
negotiations is partially explained by the historical roots of the Japanese
legal system and the historical perception of the Japanese towards attorneys. The Japanese legal system is a hybrid of Japanese, German and
United States influences.7 7 The Japanese influence is most strongly
rooted in the Tokugawa period and still permeates modern Japanese
legal norms.7 8 The German influence originated around the period of the
Meiji restoration when Japan was beginning to open its doors to the
outside world and sought to develop the Japanese legal system to accommodate the new internationalization.7 9
The U.S. influence, of course, resulted from the U.S. occupation in
Japan following Emperor Hirohito's surrender to the United States in the
75 See generally Stevens, MultinationalCorporations and the Legal Profession: The Role of the
CorporateLegal Departmentin Japan, in ABA, CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 34-41 (J. Haley ed. 1978); E. HAHN, supranote 12, at 40. In addition, it was
not until the late 1960s that Japanese companies formed corporate legal departments and the attention of Japanese attorneys began to shift to legal aspects of international business transactions.
76 Id. See also Hahn, An Overview of the JapaneseLegal System, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 517,
532 (1983) (extent of Japanese attorney's ability to redraft the written terms of agreement may be
limited by prior approval of contract by the department's section chief, the bucho). In part, the
limited role of the Japanese attorney is influenced by the Japanese attorney's training, which emphasizes practical litigation skills and the drafting of contracts. To the extent that the members of the
Japanese company's legal department are involved in the negotiations, their skills are also different
than those of a U.S attorney. Although experienced with certain practical legal skills, those persons
have only been trained in law at the university level. Id. at 531-32.
77 See, eg., Working It Out, supra note 39, at 156-59; Kaino, Some IntroductoryComments on
the HistoricalBackground of Japanese Civil Law, 16 INT'L J. Soc. L. 383 (1988).
78 Hahn, supra note 76, at 518-20. See also 2 Z. KrrIGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
§ 3.01[3] (1989); Uchtmann, Blessen & Maloney, The Developing Japanese Legal System: Growth
and Challenge in the Modern Era, 23 GONZ. L. REv. 349, 350-52 (1987) [hereinafter Uchtmann].
79 Uchtmann, supra note 78, at 352-54; Hahn, supra note 76, at 521.
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Second World War." Although the present system resembles the U.S.
model, the U.S. attorney should not assume that the Japanese legal system operates in the same manner. Indeed, any generalization of the similarity between the two systems may be misplaced and may have serious
unintended consequences, particularly with respect to contract formation
and enforcement.
Because of traditional influences from the Tokugawa Era of giri and

wa, the Japanese emphasize resolution of disputes without resort to litigation.8 1 Accordingly, the Japanese prefer that contract language specifically include provisions which require the parties "to resolve disputes in
a harmonious manner" or otherwise "confer in good faith" when a dispute arises. 82 Moreover, the Japanese are more at ease with flexible contract terms or vague provisions.83
This is contrasted with the U.S. concept of a "contract," which is
defined as a legal agreement defining the rights and responsibilities of the
parties. 84 Elements of contract consideration and individual rights, enforceable by law, influence the U.S. attorney when involved in contract
negotiation. Such emphasis on "rights" implies resort to an adversarial
process to enforce the agreement when disputes arise or one party is unable to or refuses to perform according to the terms of the contract. In a
U.S. legal environment, the court provides a forum to enforce assertions
of rights created by contract. This is in direct opposition to the grouporiented Japanese, who historically have not possessed notions of individ80 Z. KrrIGAWA, supra note 78, at § 3.01[5].
81 See, e.g., Note, Japanese Thought and Western Law: A Tangential View of the Japanese
Bengoshi and the Japanese American Attorney, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. ANN. 301, 302-13
(1986) [hereinafter Japanese Thought and Western Law]. See also Watts, supra note 19, at 598-601.
82 Watts, supra note 19, at 604; Working It Out, supra note 39, at 163-64.
83 Working It Out, supra note 39, at 162; Kawashima, supra note 4, at 16. Hence the emphasis
in negotiations upon development of the relationship. If the relationship is strong, it is assumed and
generally expected among the Japanese that the good will and mutual concern of the parties will
solve disputes or problems which might arise in the future. Cf Watts, supra note 19, at 604.
84 The contrast between Japanese and U.S. concepts of contract has been described as follows:
While in the American mind the function of contract is to anticipate possible future strife and
trouble as well as to pre-define disputes and enunciate rights, contract in the Japanese mind is a
symbolic expression or reflection of mutual trust that is expected to work favorably for both
parties in case of future trouble and never to break down.
Wagatsuma & Rosett, CulturalAttitudes Toward Contract Law: Japan and the United States Compared, 2 U.C.L.A. PAC. BAsiN L. J. 76, 84 (1983) (noting that U.S. contracts define such rights and
responsibilities through detailed provisions to which the parties resort when relations and cooperation have broken down); E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 33-34. But see Gray, The Use and Non-Use of
Contract Law in Japan: A PreliminaryStudy, 17 LAW IN JAPAN 98, 113 (1984) (suggesting that
more modem Japanese lawyers appear to have created the type of law practice similar to U.S. corporate lawyers and the tendency for small or medium-sized corporations to utilize the Japanese attorneys to participate in a broad range of corporate matters, including the negotiation and drafting of
contracts). Cf. Z. KITIGAWA, supra note 78, at § 3.02[3]; Hahn, supra note 76, at 206-07.
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ual rights. 5 Proclivity towards litigation is not characteristic of the
86
Japanese.
The Japanese legal system does not exist to enforce individual rights
and is strongly influenced by the group harmony and consensus-based
dispute resolution which is characteristic of Japanese business and Japa-

nese society generally.87 This is not to say that litigation does not occur

in Japan. However, there is significant stigma to the Japanese person or
company that resorts to or threatens litigation.8 8 Litigation also is an
undesirable method to resolve disputes because it involves a lengthy process and is very costly.8 9

Further, the Japanese are distrustful of attorneys. This distrust is
not limited to foreign attorneys, but is directed towards Japanese attorneys, or bengoshi,9° as well. 91 The distrust of Japanese attorneys in par85 See, eg., Working It Out, supra note 39, at 160, 172; Wagatsuma & Rosset, supra note 84, at
84; Kawashima & Noda, Dispute Resolution in ContemporaryJapan, in INSIDE THE JAPANESE SYSTEM: READINGS ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 191-93 (D. Okimoto &
T. Rohlen eds. 1988). See also Kawashima, supra note 4, at 6-7.
86 Tanaka, The Role of Law and Lawyers in JapaneseSociety, in INSIDE THE JAPANESE SYSTEM:
READINGS ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 194-96 (D. Okimoto & T.

Rohlen eds. 1988). But see Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359
(1978) (although Japanese are more willing to accept settlements, there are institutional barriers to
litigation, such as the lack of access to courts and insufficient capacity of the courts to provide
adequate relief).
87 Tanaka, supranote 86, at 194-96. The practitioner should not overlook, however, the potential application of Japanese law to contracts found in the Civil Code (Minpo) and the Commercial
Code (Shdsho). The Commercial Code, absent agreement to the contrary, controls most transactions, and in the absence of specific applicable provisions, customary laws will be applied. In the
event that no applicable commercial customary law is discernible, the Civil Code will apply. COMM.
CODE, ART. I. See generally 3 Z. KITIGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (1990) (in particular
chapter on "Contract Law in General").
88 See, e.g., Japanese Thought and Western Law, supra note 81, at 308, 317. Litigation also is
viewed as a failing of the parties.
89 Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in Japan and the United States, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 27, 33-35 (1989).
90 Bengoshi refers to the only class of attorneys in Japan which is authorized to represent clients
before Japanese courts. Another subclass of bengoshi, the shogai bengoshi or international practitioners, spends a substantial amount of time on international transactions or representing foreign
clients doing business in Japan or Japanese clients doing business abroad. Young, Foreign Lawyers
in Japan: A Case Study in TransnationalDispute Resolution and MarginalReform, 21 LAW IN JAPAN 84, 99-103 (1988). There are several other Japanese legal professions whose members are licensed to handle matters which would be considered the practice of law in the United States, such as
shiho shoshi, who draft and research legal documents and provide legal advice on a wide range of
subjects, koshonin (notary publics), benrishi (patent practitioners), seirishi (tax practitioners), and
gyosei shoshi (administrative scriveners). Miller, supra note 89, at 28-29. Cf. Hahn, supra note 76, at
530.
91 The distrust of attorneys in Japan is rooted in the early development of the profession which
was notoriously shady. Z. KITIGAWA, supra note 78, at § 3.02[3]; Young, supra note 90, at 95. As
time went on, despite the elevated status that the profession reached in more modern times, this
distrust resulted from the orientation of the bengoshi towards litigation which is considered at odds
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ticular is not a recent phenomenon and has existed for several
centuries.9 2 The Japanese typically consult attorneys in a very limited
fashion. Contact for dispute resolution or litigation purposes is a last
resort because such action within a purely Japanese environment would
naturally be perceived as a hostile and non-conciliatory gesture. 93 Accordingly, the cultural orientation is not only negative to a legal forum
for dispute resolution, but also to the profession. In negotiations of a
business transaction, the perception is that the lawyer will add an adversarial element which suggests that the party whom the lawyer represents
is only interested in his or her client's concerns and not in the formation

of a positive and harmonious business relationship.
B.

Current Limitations to "Legal Practice" in Japan
by Foreign Attorneys

Just as the Japanese legal system possesses similarities to the U.S.
legal system, the legal profession in Japan also bears some resemblance to
the U.S. legal profession. The most striking difference is the number of

attorneys. Unsurprisingly, Japan has the lesser number. 94 However, the
real difference is found in the practice of law in Japan. There are several
"classes" of attorneys in Japan, from the bengoshi mentioned above to
the persons who have a legal education and work in the corporate legal
department of a company or governmental agency.95 Of all such
"classes," only the bengoshi is authorized to appear before the Japanese
courts and administrative tribunals.9 6
Foreigners are virtually precluded from representing a client,
whether or not Japanese, before a Japanese court or administrative tribunal. This limitation, combined with other restrictions on the practice of
law by foreign attorneys in Japan, has come to represent a major trade
with the creation or maintenance of harmony and consensus-based dispute resolution. See, eg.,
Hahn, supra note 76, at 518-20; Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 209-10.
92 For interesting reading on the history of the Japanese bengoshi and the development of that
class of lawyers see Young, supra note 90, at 95-99; Japanese Thought and Western Law, supranote
81, at 313-17.
93 E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 35; Japanese Thought and Western Law, supra note 81, at 317;
Lansing & Wechselblatt, supra note 16, at 652-53. On the other hand, Japanese companies, particularly the larger ones, have shown less hesitation to enter into or defend against litigation in foreign
forums, such as the United States. See, eg., Thompson, JapanInc on Trial,9 CAL. LAW. 43 (May
1989).
94 A recent estimate shows that there were approximately 13,000 bengoshi in 1988. Miller, supra
note 89, at 27-28. There are other legal professions which, if combined with the number of bengoshi,
bring the number of lawyers in Japan to approximately 100,000. This contrasts with the estimated
650,000 persons licensed to practice law in the United States at the same time. Id. at 28-29.
95 See supra note 90.
96 Id.
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barrier between the United States and Japan. 97 Presently, a foreign attorney may apply to become the business law advisor or the gaikokuhi
jimu bengoshi, and if accepted, may only advise clients on the law of his
or her home jurisdiction. The foreign attorney is still precluded from
representing a client in a Japanese forum or advising a client regarding
98
Japanese law.

Despite the limitations on the scope of the practice, which have
tended to cause some practitioners or law firms to consider penetration
into the Japanese market to be unrealistic, there are other difficult qualifications which an attorney must possess to initially apply. Those qualifications include:
(1) The applicant must possess at least five years of practice in his or her
"home jurisdiction;"
(2) The applicant's "home jurisdiction" must provide reciprocity to Japanese bengoshi, i.e., permit qualified bengoshi the ability to become foreign
legal consultants;

(3) The applicant must not have engaged in any criminal activity or other
acts of incompetence or unethical behavior which would otherwise constitute grounds for disqualification under Japanese law; and
(4) The applicant must be able to compensate clients for damages. 99

Although the qualifications might appear less onerous in the United
States for a foreign attorney to practice law, as of 1988, only six states
and the District of Columbia could meet the reciprocity requirement." °
The major justification for Japan's current restrictive policies are expressed by claims that lessening the restrictions would seriously alter the
Japanese legal system's capability to reinforce traditional influences of
group harmony and conciliatory dispute resolution.10 1 In other words, it
97 Discussion of the trade issues is beyond the scope of this article. In 1988 there was a symposium on the foreign practice of law in Japan co-sponsored by the Japan-America Society and American Bar Association and the topics and related articles appear in volume 21 of LAW IN JAPAN. See
also R. WOHL, S. CHEMTOB, & G. FUKUSHIMA, PRACTICE BY FOREIGN LAWYERS IN JAPAN

(1989).
98 Tadaki, The Gaikokuhd Jimu Bengoshi System: Circumstances of Acceptance and Scope of
Practice, 21 LAW IN JAPAN 122, 131-36 (1988). Home jurisdiction, as it is used here, refers to the
state in which the attorney is admitted to practice. There is currently no reciprocity between Japan
and the United States on a national level with respect to the practice of law in either country. For
those states which do qualify under a reciprocity arrangement with Japan, see infra note 100.
99 Iteya, GaikokuhdJimuBengoshiin Japan,21 LAW IN JAPAN 141-48 (1988). For a full text of
the law see Note, SpecialMeasures Law Concerningthe HandlingofLegal Business by Foreign Lawyers, 21 LAW INJAPAN 193 (1988). See also Note, Gaikoku BengoshiHi Foreign Lawyers in Japan:
The DynamicsBehind Law No. 66, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1489 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign Lawyers in
Japan].
100 Iteya, supra note 99, at 147-48. The seven jurisdictions are: California, New York, Hawaii,
Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, and the District of Columbia. Cf., Foreign Lawyers in Japan, supra
note 99, at 1500-03.
101 MacMullin, Foreign Attorneys in Japan: Past Policies, the New Special Measures Law and
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will more resemble the U.S. system, which is not perceived as an altogether more superior system."2
On the other hand, there are significant external and internal influences which suggest that there may be broader opportunities for legal
practice in Japan.10 3 It is not anticipated, however, that the major issues
which limit foreign practice will be resolved in the short run and the
attorney practicing in Japan, even as a gaikokuhifimu bengoshi, will
continue to need to rely a great deal on the Japanese bengoshi. 04 Thus,
efforts to develop strong relationships with members of the Japanese bar
are greatly recommended.
IV.

IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CONTRACT

Despite the bias against the written contract as the embodiment of
the parties' relationship or of the incidents of the transaction, the Japanese side is aware of the need for a clear contract and the trend, especially with larger concerns, is to draft agreements in characteristically
United States detail.105 Consequently, this section is concerned with
identifying "boilerplate" provisions which relate principally to enforcement and conflict of law, as well as to identify some of the considerations
for particular provisions.
The form of contract should contain some provisions which are
common to purely Japanese transactions, such as the "meet and confer in
good faith" and the "resolve disputes in a harmonious manner" requirements.' 016 The U.S. side should raise the question in negotiations, however, of the next step should such conciliatory efforts prove unsuccessful.
This should be done very cautiously and after a positive sense of the
relationship has been achieved. Although the initial reaction may not be
favorable, this issue presents a good opportunity to establish some
Future Expectations,4 FLA. INT'L L. J. 51, 73-75 (1988) (also indicating a fear of losing a substantial
share of the international business market to foreign attorneys as well as a belief that foreign attorneys will not be loyal to the political and cultural values observed in Japan).
102 See, e.g., Fuhrman, Lions at the Gate, 10 CAL. LAW. 30, 33 (July 1990).
103 Id. at 78-73; Foreign Lawyers in Japan,supra note 99, at 1517-19; Cone, The Future ofForeign
Law Offices in Japan, 21 LAw IN JAPAN 76 (1988); Shapiro, Current Opportunitiesand the Changing
Market: The Future of Foreign Law Offices in Japan, 21 LAw IN JAPAN 79 (1988); Forte, Despite
Barriers,Firms to Head to Japan, L.A. DAILY J. - CAL. L. Bus. 3 (Sept. 10, 1990 supp.).
104 Although the gaikokuhijimu bengoshi may not advise on Japanese law and is prohibited from
certain types of joint enterprises, there are some circumstances in which collaboration with bengoshi
is encouraged and also required. This type of cooperation is perceived to benefit both the gaikokuhd
jimu bengoshi and the Japanese bengoshi. See, e.g., Tadaki, supra note 98, at 136-37, 140.
105 See, eg., Hahn, supra note 76, at 520-21; Zhang & Kuroda, supra note 9, at 206-07.
106 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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ground rules and determine the extent to which the Japanese side may be
flexible.
In addition, the parties may desire to establish when Japanese law
will control and when the law of the jurisdiction of the United States will
control. This is recommended for two obvious reasons. First, it resolves
potential ambiguity; second, it avoids conflict of law issues. 10 7 Another
important reason which should not be overlooked, however, is that it
establishes the forum for enforcement of the agreement if ultimately necessary. One commentator has suggested that Japanese courts have little
trouble enforcing the terms of those agreements which specify the extent
to which such laws govern.
It is this author's opinion that provisions which actually make litigation the least desirable means for resolution of disputes for both parties
should be utilized. For example, if litigation is to ultimately become an
option for the parties, the issues of personal jurisdiction, process and discovery are areas in which the parties may provide consent in the agreement by designating which jurisdiction's law is to govern. 10 8 This
actually does not create an advantage for the U.S. party if a U.S. forum is
selected, although litigation becomes less of an obstacle. Regardless of
the selection of forum for resolution of disputes through litigation, the
process will still be long and cumbersome which may allow for greater
compromise in areas of dispute or conflict.
Accordingly, pre-litigation arbitration or formal dispute resolution
may be provided as a condition precedent to either party initiating litigation. 109 The time frame for resolution should be within any applicable or
potential statute of limitations period so that neither party loses the lev107 E. HAHN, supranote 12, at 79-82. If the contract is written in both English and Japanese, the
parties should specify which version should control. Id at 42.
108 Caution should be exercised with these provisions since standard Japanese practice and custom are frequently used to resolve contractual terms when the terms are too vague. Id. Specific
jurisdiction, process and discovery rules are beyond the scope of this article. However, a good discussion can be found by consulting Kim & Sisneros, Comparative Overview of Service of Process:
United States and Japan, and Attempts at International Unity, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299
(1990); Robinson, The Japanesein the United States: Jurisdiction,Service of Process, Discovery, and
Related ProceduralIssues, in ABA, JAPAN-UNITED STATES TRADE AND INVESTMENT: STRATE-

GIES FOR THE 1990s 295 (1989). Compare E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 81-82 (jurisdiction), 86-87
(service of process), and 84-86 (enforcement of judgments); Ishimatsu & Suntag, Depositions in Japan Can Be Tricky, L.A. DAILY J. - CAL. L. Bus. 4 (May 29, 1990 supp.).
109 See, e.g., E. HAHN, supra note 12, at 82-84 (noting that arbitration clauses are very common
in contracts involving the Japanese). For discussion regarding dispute settlement through a variety
of forms including arbitration, see generally 7 Z. KITIGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (1990)
(particularly Part XIV on "Dispute Settlement," which contains separate chapters on conciliation
and arbitration).
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erage which the threat of litigation presents.110 Again, as a reminder,
litigation should be an absolute last resort. A bad reputation to use litigation other than as a last resort likely will preclude willingness of the
opposite party to maintain the agreement longer than necessary or discourage other Japanese enterprises from entering into an agreement.
It may be desirable to develop a memorandum of understanding or
insert appropriate provisions detailing the assistance to be provided each
party on matters which are controlled by an administrative agency or
ministry. To the extent that administrative regulation of the particular
transaction can be memorialized, it may also be helpful to define the entity and the scope of regulation. This may identify regulatory issues
which present obstacles to complete performance and the manner in
which the parties may resolve potential disputes in this context.
The down-side of detailing the agreement is the preclusion for harmonious resolution if one party is able to insist on specific terms. There
are always matters which are overlooked or not anticipated. The main
objective should not be to create issues which may be litigated, but to
avoid litigation as much as possible.
A Japanese bengoshi should be consulted to review the agreement
from the U.S. party's standpoint. The bengoshi can not only review the
language contained in particular provisions, but can be consulted for application of Japanese law to particular issues and other litigation-related
issues.1" Despite restrictions upon "partnerships" between Japanese
bengoshi and U.S. attorneys, including the gaikokuhdjimu bengoshi,joint
review of the agreement and comparative analysis is permitted and
12
strongly recommended.
110 In Japan, the basic rule for extinctive prescription (the acquisition of rights and relief from
obligation-duties by means of a lapse of a certain period of time) with respect to obligation-rights
arising from commercial acts is five years. There are, however, specific time periods for particular
instances, e.g., property rights, rights established by judgment, etc. See generally 3 Z. KITiGAWA,
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 1.17 (1990).
111 Cf supra note 71. The U.S. side should understand the potential for misunderstanding if
Japanese law applies in a manner which contract language did not preclude or because there was an
assumption that the English and Japanese terms did not vary. This may arise in connection with the
existence of different connotations and interpretations of particular words. See, e.g., Zhang &
Kuroda, supra note 9, at 205-06. A good example would be those legal terms for which there is no
precise Japanese translation or which have no legal significance to the Japanese. See, e.g., E. HAHN,
supra note 12, at 42. Care should also be exercised with terms which are not purely legal terms but
may create potential for serious discrepancy, such as the currency to be used or the exchange rate.
Id. Not only should the U.S. side understand the nuances of a Japanese contract, but should make
sure that the Japanese side fully understands the implications of a detailed U.S. contract. Lansing &
Wechselblatt, supra note 16, at 656.
112 Tadaki, supra note 98, at 140 (specifically noting that collaboration on individual cases is
unrestricted and a "constant business cooperation relationship" is permitted if restrictions against
partnerships or sharing profits with bengoshi have not been circumvented).
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In all provisions, the Japanese attention to detail should also apply
to the U.S. citizen in international transactions, particularly with the
Japanese. Japanese businesses are becoming more sophisticated in these
areas and may eventually gain an advantage against those who "do not
do their homework." Unless particular provisions have strong justification, it is more than likely that the Japanese side will not agree to their
inclusion.' 13 Over time, however, it is anticipated that very little differ-

ence will be discernible in contracts for international transactions between Japanese and U.S. concerns.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are no quick fixes or shortcuts in negotiations which involve a
Japanese party. It is this author's hope that this article focused the

reader's attention on methods which may facilitate a positive relationship
between Japanese and U.S. parties to a transaction, which should begin
at very early stages. Both sides have a great deal to gain from successful
joint enterprises. However, there is always potential for the relationship
to sour, and often times unnecessarily and avoidably.
Understanding that cultural differences may create barriers and developing ways to overcome them will do much toward success of the
transaction. Ignoring those differences and insisting on the terms of a
written document most often will broaden the gap. Clients should be
advised of these dynamics at the outset so that they can gauge the desirability of the transaction and their endurance for the negotiation process.
If an agreement is ultimately executed, the real work begins and the
maintenance of the relationship with the Japanese party should almost
1 14
take on greater importance at this stage than during the negotiations.
113 This will not occur as a flat rejection of certain terms but may result from the time-consuming
process of consensus decision-making and the intentional twisting of or asserted inability to understand certain legal meanings. See supra notes 19, 36-39 and accompanying discussion. Even clauses
generally considered by U.S. attorneys to be boilerplate will be subjected to countless revisions.
Mori,supra note 4, at 50. Consequently, those terms upon which the U.S. side should insist should
be carefully selected and the justification or necessity for such terms should be clearly identified by
the U.S. team so that its explanation will have greater impact.
114 Maintenance of a long-term relationship will require participation in not only Japanese business customs, but in continued generation of good will exemplified by ceremonial attention in followup contacts, both written and in person, and in gift-giving during key seasons. Written follow-ups
include letters indicating appreciation and gratitude for the ultimate execution of the contract and to
inquire into the status of the transaction. Socializing is also very important to the Japanese and
should be part of the agenda when face to face follow-up contacts occur. See, eg., R. TUNG, supra
note 2, at 55-58. The U.S. side should be prepared to invest in fairly regular follow-up visits to Japan
as an expression of sincere interest in the relationship, and not just when problems arise.
On the subject of gift-giving, the attorney should become familiar with not only the appropriate
occasions on which to give a gift, but the significance of certain gifts and manner of gift-giving. Gift-
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In the end, it should be recognized that the relationship is what truly
matters. The time taken to become aware of and be sensitive to the cultural details will be well worth the effort, and should prove to be a necessary ingredient if the attorney wishes to engage in transactions involving
Japanese parties.
Gam'batte, and learn to say, "Doozo yoroshiku onegai shimasu."1 15
giving in Japan has strong traditional roots and occurs as an expression of the giver's true feelings of
friendship, gratitude and respect. There are two "must-give" occasions in Japanese culture: the 0seibo at year end and the 0-chugen in midsummer. 0-seibo extends from about November 15th to
the end of the year and is comparable to the U.S. gift-giving customs at Christmas, without the
religious overtones. 0-chugen lasts for two weeks anywhere from June 15 to August 15, depending
on the local region's custom. The gifts are meant to express appreciation for the recipient's cooperation and support during the year. Other gift-giving occasions will depend on the type of relationship
which has developed between the principal parties to the relationship.
Certain types of gifts are appropriate given particular occasions, although gifts which relate to
an interest or hobby of a particular recipient, especially those of high quality and from the United
States, are generally recommended. See, eg., D. ROWLAND, supra note 5, at 79-84. This adds a
personal touch. When presenting a gift to the Japanese it is customary to extend it with both hands
as a sign of respect and humility. One should also indicate that "it is a trifle," despite actual cost.
The Japanese do this not as false modesty, but to say that the relationship is considered much more
important than the gift itself or even the price paid for the gift. Other forms of etiquette should be
learned, as these gestures will be deeply appreciated by the Japanese party to the transaction.
115 "Gam'batte" is a colloquial Japanese expression meaning "Good Luck." The phrase "Doozo
yoroshiku onegai shimasu" is an expression for which there is no precise English translation, but is
understood to request that the hearer bestow a favor upon the speaker in the most humblest of terms
(e.g., "Please remember me favorably"). In Japan, members from opposite sports teams say that this
expression before the beginning of the game as they bow to each other.

The Lawyer-Negotiator in Japan

12:335(1991)
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED RESOURCES AND MATERIALS

I.

Important Organizations and Agencies

A. Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). This is a nonprofit organization established to promote foreign trade and commerce in
Japan. JETRO has several offices in the United States, including New
York, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Denver, Los Angeles and San
Francisco. Specific addresses are identified below. The offices provide
some assistance in locating or identifying Japanese companies from their
extensive listings, which may present opportunity for strategic fit. In addition, JETRO provides seminars, offers consultation and evaluation of
proposed projects.
Office locations in the United States, including addresses and phone
numbers, are as follows:
245 Peachtree Center Avenue
Suite 2208, Marquis One Tower
Atlanta, GA 30303
(404) 681-0600
401 N. Michigan Avenue
Suite 660
Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 527-9000
One Tabor Center
1200 17th Street, Suite 1110
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 629-0404
McGraw-Hill Building
1221 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 4400
New York, NY 10020
(212) 997-0400
725 South Figueroa Street
Suite 1890
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 624-8855
Quantas Building
360 Post Street, Suite 501
San Francisco, CA 94108
(415) 392-1333
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One Houston Center
Suite 2360, 1221 McKinney
Houston, TX 77010
(713) 759-9595
World Trade Center Dallas
2100 Stemmons Freeway, Suite 152-1
P.O. Box 58234
Dallas, TX 75258
(214) 651-0839
B. Japanese Embassy. The Japanese Government maintains its
embassy in the United States at 2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20008 (202-939-6700). Consulate General Offices are
located in New York, Chicago, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, Atlanta, New Orleans, Houston, Kansas City,
Honolulu, and Anchorage.
C. U.S. Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce, located at 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C. 20230 (202-377-2867), can supply interested parties with
information on Japan, export opportunities in Japan, as well as details on
trade fairs. Persons planning to export to Japan may use the Department's agency - distributorship service to help find an agent in Japan.
D. U.S. International Trade Commission. The International
Trade Commission, located at 500 E Street, S.W., in Washington, D.C.
20436 (202-205-2000), has numerous international trade studies, statistical data and tariff schedules of the United States.
E. Other organizations too numerous to list, can be consulted for
a variety of specific purposes. See, e.g., such publications as U. S. Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Report: Marketing in Japan
(OBR 87-02) published in April 1987 at pages 34-37; and D. Rowland,
Japanese Business Etiquette (1985) at pages 156-164.
II.

Publication Lists

A. Britt, The JapaneseLegal System and InternationalTrade: UpTo-Date Sources of Information in English, 82 LAW LIBR. J. 313 (1990).
Provides an updated annotated list of several different sources of current
information on subjects related to the Japanese legal system and trade.
B. Feldman, Annoted Bibliography: Japanese Law and Society, 21
LAW IN JAPAN 219 (1988). Provides an annotated list on a variety of
subjects, including "Explaining Japanese Non-Litigiousness: Culture vs.
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Structure," constitutional law, antitrust, administrative law, legal history, regulation of the legal profession, and contracts.
C. E. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
(1984). Includes a bibliography of suggested reading and materials
consulted.
D. R. COLEMAN & J. HALEY, AN INDEX TO JAPANESE LAW: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WESTERN LANGUAGE MATERIALS 1867-1973
(1975). This is a special issue of the legal periodical, LAW IN JAPAN,
published by the Japanese American Society for Legal Studies.
E.

R. NERI, U.S./JAPAN

FOREIGN TRADE: AN ANNOTATED BIB-

(1988). Provides an annotated listing of books or articles on the following subject categories:
culture and society or social dynamics; science, technology and environment; law and politics; general works on the economy; economic planning; finance; commerce, business and industry; industrial management,
organization and productivity; industrial relations; U.S.-Japan relations
and U.S.-Japan economic relations.
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